An Error-Theory of Consciousness by Perlis, Don
CS-TR-3324 | July 19, 1994UMIACS-TR-94-91 An Error-Theory of ConsciousnessDon PerlisInstitute for Advanced Computer StudiesComputer Science DepartmentAV Williams BldgUniversity of MarylandCollege Park, MD 20742perlis@cs.umd.eduAbstractI argue that consciousness is an aspect of an agent's intelligence, hence of its abilityto deal adaptively with the world. In particular, it allows for the possibility of notingand correcting the agent's own errors. This in turn requires a robust self model aspart of its world model, as well as the capability to come to see that world model asresiding in its belief base (part of its self model), while then representing the actualworld as possibly dierent, i.e., forming a new world model. This suggests particularcomputational mechanisms by which consciousness occurs, ones that conceivably couldbe discovered by neuroscientists, as well as built into articial systems that may needsuch capabilities. Consciousness, then, would not be an epiphenomenon at all, butrather a key part of the functional architecture of suitably intelligent agents, henceamenable to study as much as any other architectural feature.Note: this paper will appear as a chapter in {\em Toward a ScientificBasis for Consciousness}, edited by Stuart Hameroff et al, MIT Press.----------------------------------------------------------------------------Work done with partial support from the Army Research Office (DAAH0494G0238).
An Error-Theory of ConsciousnessDon PerlisDepartment of Computer ScienceandInstitute for Advanced Computer StudiesUniversity of MarylandCollege Park, MD 20742301-405-2685perlis@cs.umd.edu
This research was supported in part by a grant from the U.S. Army Research Oce(DAAH0494G0238). 2
AbstractI argue that consciousness is an aspect of an agent's intelligence, hence of its abilityto deal adaptively with the world. In particular, it allows for the possibility of notingand correcting the agent's own errors. This in turn requires a robust self model aspart of its world model, as well as the capability to come to see that world model asresiding in its belief base (part of its self model), while then representing the actualworld as possibly dierent, i.e., forming a new world model. This suggests particularcomputational mechanisms by which consciousness occurs, ones that conceivably couldbe discovered by neuroscientists, as well as built into articial systems that may needsuch capabilities. Consciousness, then, would not be an epiphenomenon at all, butrather a key part of the functional architecture of suitably intelligent agents, henceamenable to study as much as any other architectural feature.
1 IntroductionConsciousness serves the function of allowing a system to distinguish itself from the restof the world, conferring a point of view on the system, hence providing Perry's essentialindexical \I" (Perry 1979); this plays an important role in error-correction, and bears onthe problem of intentionality. Consciousness is then, rst and foremost, self-consciousness.This theme will be argued throughout what follows. I begin with what may seem like avery dierent issue, but which will in fact provide a key: the distinction between a symboland its referent.No one mistakes a symbol for what it stands for; we easily distinguish the two. Thesymbol is something we use in our thinking, hence instances of it occur in us, in our beliefbase, in our self model; whereas the symboled is in the world, and merely represented bythe internal symbol in our self-model. We have direct control over the one (the internalsymbol) and not the other (the symboled world). Thus we can alter our images or ideas orwords: we alter the expression \this is a dog" to \this is a wolf" at will (whether for whimor speculation or to correct a false belief), but we do not so easily change a dog into a wolf.This symbol-symboled distinction suggests several things, which I will detail in what follows.But I will note rst that this rather obvious distinction is not currently put to much use inarticial intelligence systems, nor in psychology, linguistics, and neuroscience; it has beenlargely ignored, except in developmental psychology, where it surfaces in the appearance-reality distinction. I suggest that it may in fact play a very key role in intelligence andconsciousness. Its proper handling requires the self-vs.-world models as stated above, andcan be seen in computational terms in part as a kind of quotation mechanism, i.e., \Ralph"is a word in my thoughts and stands for Ralph in the world.When an agent's reasoning behavior is reected into its self-model, then it has be-come recorded as part of its narrative self-history, a term suggestive of Dennett's interno-phenomenological report (Dennett 1991). I suggest that this is a key component of that1
behavior's being conscious: it takes its place in episodic memory, as something that oc-curred in or to the agent. Without this double-layer of representation (as being outside theagent and also symboled inside the agent), there is no \I" and no awareness (see below formore on double representation).Thus for a brain structure to provide consciousness, it must be complex enough to beable to provide a self-in-the-world, a symbol-to-symboled tie that links a self model to aworld model and can adjust the latter if errors are encountered. Various neural maps cometo mind here, that may be part of a larger system of self-world representations: tectal maps,eerence copies, thalamic maps, sensori-motor homunculi.In several earlier papers (Perlis 1987, 1990, 1991, to appear) I present various aspects ofthis theory, but mainly focusing on the problem of intentionality (language and meaning).Here I emphasize instead the themes of mind and consciousness per se.2 Double representation and errorAs noted above, people can make a distinction between a symbol and what object-of-reference it stands for, hence our thinking must have distinct representations for things andtheir representations. Such a distinction is a double-representation, in eect, since whenmaking it people do not have immediate access to the real external objects (we never do).We have a representation for the referent (that representation can be the symbol itself) andanother for the symbol when we want to talk about the symbol. Quotation is one devicewe use, out of many: \Joe" is the name of Joe; \dog" refers to dogs. Another term somemay prefer is reection: I can reect on (some of) my referring inner states as inner statesinstead of what they refer to.Yet another way to view this is in terms of imagination: when we take something tobe in our heads and (not necessarily) out there, we are imagining it. Thus I can imagine a2
\Joe" by using some of the internal tags I would use for a real Joe; some but not all, sincein imagination I suspend belief, which is to say (so I argue) that I quote (or reect upon ormention) my internal usages instead of simply using them.Even though double, the distinction is useful, perhaps crucial, for it allows us tremendousexibility to reconsider our beliefs, to see our beliefs as mere beliefs rather than brute truths:it allows us the wisdom that we are after all holders of imperfect views of reality, and thefurther wisdom that we can try to improve our views by nding our errors and correctingthem. It allows what at one moment is a pure symbol undistinguished from what it standsfor, to become at a later moment quoted or otherwise seen as an object of thought, somethinginside and not the outer reality.To relate this to a familiar subjective sense: We nd ourselves engaged in a nearly con-stant back-and-forth between naive belief and circumspect self-querying, as we go throughthe day thinking about things; we are aware of thinking, aware of time passing, of ourselveswith goals and being in partway through an ever-evolving eort.This can be the profound wisdom of a philosopher; or the profane wisdom of a raccoonrubbing water out of its eyes, not long mistaking its still-watery view with the dry worldit has struggled to from the lake. We are constantly bombarded by such clashes in ourperceptions, and we iron them out by noting, rst of all, that we are possessed of views andthat not all of them are correct (if they are in mutual conict). This I think is a very basicphenomenon, not requiring explicit human-style language, but more like a very primitive(perhaps mostly visual) language of thought.This same line of argument suggests that importance of dividing the world into externalreality and internal view, a kind of other-vs-self distinction. Thus I think that a self-notion orself-model is probably of major importance to the study of mind, possibly even that withouta self-representation there would be no mind/consciousness. According to this view, agentG cannot be conscious of event Y unless G represents an intentionality relation between3
G and Y: G must record the fact of its representing Y by means of a symbol (or image)`Y' that is inside G. G not only represents Y with `Y', G also represents the relationshipbetween Y, `Y' and G itself, along with means to adjust it. Thus G's situatedness in theworld that includes Y is central to this notion of consciousness. There can be no box ofpure unsituated consciousness, no box of \perceiving redness", without an observer that isitself part of what is observed.This also bears on Searle's Chinese room (Searle 1980). To understand a word is to tieit to a part of one's world model. Searle's scenario does not consider such double represen-tations. His discussion leads one to imagine that the book of instructions for manipulatingChinese symbols does not involve data structures that represent the room itself or the factthat it is using symbols for external entities. On the error-theory such a limited scenariowould in fact not be conscious, nor would it have true intentionality. But this would not bea condemnation of computationalism; it would simply illustrate that the Turing test is notenough to guarantee mental content, that some computational models do not have such,and leaving open whether some others might.How is it that symbols can represent entities at all, especially distant ones beyond thesymbol-manipulating machinery (Searle's room), is a distinct question that Searle conateswith those of understanding and consciousness. I address the former below.3 IntentionalityThis leaves untouched the issue of how symbol (belief) and symboled (reality) becomelinked, beyond \simple" cases such as staring wide-awake at a close bright red dot in awell-lighted room: here the dot-symbol in the brain (in whatever distributed neuronal formit may take) symbols the actual dot. But how about visualizing a dot far o and out ofsight? That is much harder to characterize since we do not have ready access to what is4
symboled, hence no obvious clue that those neuronal processes \mean" a far o dot.In (Perlis, 1991) I take an even simpler case than the close red dot as a basic one for myanalysis: one's own foot. Our foot we can see, and also think about when the visual linkis broken (eyes closed, looking up at the sky, etc) But we cannot (without severe damage)break the neuronal links between foot and sensorimotor homunculi, or between foot andtectum. So I propose to make such built-in wirings a key part of a theory of mind (or ofsymbol-symboled relations), with the concomitant self-other (internal-external) distinctionsabove: we can imagine our foot to be amputated, or in fact discover that it has been whenvisual and sensorimotor signals conict. We quickly realize that the reality is not necessarilythe same as the belief, and we struggle to bring the two into accord. Of course, if the neurallink is broken, we usually nd conicts between our senses: our eyes tell us the foot is there,but our proprioception tells us otherwise, so we need to employ circumspection (suspendingbelief, seeing beliefs as possibilities, just in our heads) for a time in order to undertake toresolve the matter (e.g., by trying to wiggle our toes, or whatever). In (Perlis, to appear)I oer suggestions as to how such an account might be extended beyond bodily reference,based on internal geometry and bodily situatedness and recalibration during motion.This again ts into my claim above that self is crucial: meaning is measured by referenceto the agent's own body, e.g., via homuncular and other cortical and tectal maps, andinvolving that body's situatedness in the environment: this pain is in my leg; that red ballis in front of me. When we are conscious of X, we are also conscious of X in relation toourselves: it is here, or there, or seen from a certain angle, or thought about this way andthen that. Indeed, without a self model, it is not clear to me intuitively what it means tosee or feel something: it seems to me that a point of view is needed, a place from which thescene is viewed or felt, dening the place occupied by the viewer. Without something alongthese lines, I think that a \neuronal box" would indeed \confuse" symbol and symboled: toit there is no external reality, it has no way to \think" (consider alternatives) at all. Thus Idisagree (e.g., Crick, 1994, p. 21) that self-consciousness is a special case of consciousness:5
I suspect it is the most basic form of all.4 Appearance-reality distinctionI think that reasoning plays an interesting role here, especially in the recent studies of non-monotonic reasoning, in which reasoners may change their minds based on nding conictsin their beliefs. I think that this too can be seen as an appearance- (or belief-) realitydistinction (ARD, see Flavell et al 1986). To sum up all the above, the ARD is I think aninteresting a candidate for much of what passes as \mind" and it is amenable to technicalstudy (in psychology, AI, linguistics, and hopefully neuroscience). (So far it has primarilybeen studied only in developmental psychology.) The ARD is the capacity to distinguishbetween how something appears and how it is. This usually is applied to perceptual judge-ments (that ball looks blue in this light but it is really white); however, the concept makessense in far broader settings, such as judging that one's belief that John is old is mistaken(and should be revised). In computational terms, such an ability involves distinguishingthe belief that John is old from the reality, hence the belief is not (or at least no longer)seen as being the reality: instead the belief is seen as something inside the believer, madeup of objects such as the word \John".An individual with a damaged ARD capacity, would presumably have loss of the abilityto distinguish words from their meanings, thus no ability to comprehend that someone haslied, for instance, or that by moving her head she can see something better. I am not awareof such a clinical diagnosis.There may be a related disorder in visual awareness: someone who cannot distinguish aseen object from how it looks. Such a person may be puzzled at things becoming blurred inrainy weather, for instance (compare to the raccoon example above) or in their disappearingas night falls. This would, to say the least, be a very severe disorder of thought. If I am6
right, it would amount to the loss of thought altogether, leaving only a mindless and slavishrecording of inputs with possible reactive responses (no weighing of alternatives). Accordingto the error-theory, such a person would not be conscious (not have a mind).5 Conclusions and neural connectionsLaying down (or recalling) an episodic store (of event E) may then be the same thing asbeing conscious of E. At least such would appear to have some components requisite tothe error-theory: self model, world model, and appropriately exible connections betweenthe two, and seems closely linked to the narrative self-history idea as well. Computationalstudies in progress indicate great advantage may accrue to an agent with such capacities.Such a conception of consciousness is a bit dierent from short-term memory or long-term memory or even their conjunction. It involves these two plus a self model, a model ofone's process of laying down an episodic store; not in physiological detail of course, but ahigh level model of the self as an entity that is undergoing an event and recording it as anexperience. Such a conception provides room for Dennett's Orwellian and Stalinesque sce-narios (as distinct from one another) and also for reasoned change of mind if it is found thatthe store is inaccurate. Presumably various forms of reasoning can be applied to the storein the process of such recalibrations|category formation and adjustment, nonmonotonicreasoning, and variable instantiation among them.I am currently working toward a reformulation of the above ideas that might lendthemselves to experimental insights, especially using recent imaging techniques. The hopewould be that suciently ne-grained imaging might be able to isolate brain areas thatperform appearance-reality checks, a kind of neural quotation (or imagination) device. Thewell-known neural maps such as eerence copy come to mind as perhaps primitive versionsof such a mechanism. 7
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